On Truth, Violence, and Order

If one were to draw one principal that human behaviour ought to follow, common to the multitude of religions that exist in history, then the commandment to be truthful would be a strong contender for such a position. Even within the realm of political and moral philosophy which do not necessarily confine to one, or even any, formal religion, the alleviation of ‘truth’ to a supreme position is often visible. Gandhi, of course, went to the extent of stating that “there is no religion higher than Truth”.

It is a gracious pastime of a non-believer to subject the phenomenon - the supreme position that this ‘concept’ has been gifted by the society to guide human behavior – to the rigors of rationality. And for this purpose I wish to draw certain tenants of social behaviour from economics. Economists would tend to agree that social ‘order’ is necessary for continued reproduction of goods and services. The nature of the ‘order’ may and does vary, but it allows for the coexistence of diverse people and allows them to engage in the social process of production. It must however be noted that ‘order’ does not mean a state of existence where there is no violence. On the contrary some degree of violence, actual or potential, is necessary for the continued maintenance of order. In a slave society this may take the form of the master’s physically violent domination over the slave; in modern capitalist societies there is the coercive power of the state and its police force. But in a state of order the degree and level of violence cannot be such that it disrupts the social process of production.

The link between violence and social order is not linear, but highly complex, and can vary over space and time. What however connects a particular social order and the requisite level of violence is ‘social contract’. In modern capitalist societies social contracts may take various forms including the workers contract with the firm, the firms contract with the government regarding environmental norms, patents, private property rights, and so on. These social contracts attempt to maintain the existing social formation to continue production, and are themselves maintained by violence or threat of violence.

These social contracts in the ‘economic sphere’ have a parallel in the ‘personal sphere’. When humans engage in personal relationships, investment and returns are both in the form of emotions. Though variables like the rates of return or gestation periods are immeasurable in the personal sphere, as opposed to the economic sphere, there is a critical commonality and a vital difference.

The commonality is that in both one or more of the individuals engaged in the social contract have the potential to reduce the well-being of the other individuals engaged in the contract by disrespecting or breaking it. For example in the ‘economic sphere’ a firm by infringing on the patents of another firm can reap profits at the cost of its competitor’s loss. In the personal sphere a child by exhibiting uncaring behaviour towards the parents may cause the latter considerable emotional pain.

The vital difference is that the perpetual threat of violence is neither desirable nor convenient method of building personal relationships, due to a variety of psychological reasons. One reason being that economic relationships enter the human body (and mind) in the form of commodities, devoid of the power to affect human emotions as deeply as personal relationships; unlike economic relationship where each agent assumes rational behaviour of the other, personal relationships go on to influence the very nature and behavioral patterns of individuals.

Thus arises a problem: the need to maintain social relationships in the personal sphere, but the inability to do it conveniently through violence. Hence the conception of ‘truthful’ behaviour as a divine necessity as the solution; individuals lead by morals, ethics and religions, act as the slaves of the constructs of their own mind, which itself is a result of a social necessity, for their own good.

This does not however mean that violence plays no role in ensuring truthful human behaviour. The conception of ‘hell’ of one kind or another in various religions and associated punishments for lying, do indeed create a threat of violence in human consciousness. This virtual threat of violence as opposed to actual violence which one man could perpetuate on another, is merely the creation of ones own mind, and its sole function is to perform the task of actual violence in its absence. If humans were to behave truthfully by social enlightenment and by understanding the practical necessity of doing so, religion would lose one of its important purposes.